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The People's Constitution vs. The
Lawyer's Constitution: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate
over Originalism
Saul Cornell
The debate over constitutional Originalism continues to spark scholarly
controversy.' The most recent development in this contested history is the
emergence of so-called "New Originalism," an approach that eschews the
search for the subjective intent of either the Framers or Ratifiers and
instead focuses on the public meaning of the text at the time of the
Founding.2 A somewhat under-theorized version of this theory even made
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seminars for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Jack Balkin, Mary Bilder, Mitchell
Berman, Joseph Blocher, Chuck Dyke, Stephen Griffin, Allan Hazlett, Nancy Isenberg, Hedi
Kitrosser, Michael Rappaport, Lawrence Rosenthal, Babak Siavoshy, and the editors of the Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities, especially Yeney Hernandez, for helpful suggestions.
1. On Originalism as a movement, see JONATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005). On methodological and interpretive issues, see
JACK N. RAKOVE, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1990);
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989);
and Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). For recent critiques of Originalism, see
Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); and Stephen M. Griffin,
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185 (2008).
2. On New Originalism, see Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
599 (2004). This interpretive theory goes under several different names: public meaning Originalism,
original understanding Originalism, and semantic Originalism. For some proponents of this theory,
the focus of interpretation is on fictive readers, the average rational man on the street or a hypothetical
fully informed reader of the Constitution. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,
45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999); and Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L.
REV. 327, 398 (2002). Another variant of this theory, semantic originalism focuses on linguistic
meaning, sometimes described as sentence meaning, timeless meaning, or semantic meaning. See
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 923 (2009)
[hereinafter Solum, District of Columbia] and more fully Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism
(Ill. Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l120244
[hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism]. One strand of New Originalism, called original methods
Originalism, claims to employ the Founders' own interpretive methodology, but in application this
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a cameo appearance in Justice Scalia's majority opinion in District of
Columbia v. Heller.3
While champions of New Originalism claim to have solved the
problems of traditional Originalism and identified a means of elucidating
an objective meaning of the Constitution, this theory has not solved the
basic problem with Originalism: the absence of a rigorous historical
methodology.' Any effort to explore the original meaning of the
Constitution must deal with a range of methodological problems inherent
in any work of intellectual history.' Moreover, New Originalists have
assumed the existence of an interpretive consensus when there was none
at the Founding. 6 Americans were just as deeply divided over questions of
constitutional methodology then as they are now.' Any choice we make
about how to interpret the Constitution, including the emphasis on public
meaning favored by New Originalists, invariably commits us to a position
in the Founding Era's debates. There simply is no neutral Archimedean
point from which any Originalist can begin discerning the true original
meaning of the Constitution.! The suggestion that constitutional meaning
is derived by elaborating the public meaning of the Constitution's text and
not by recourse to the intent of its Framers or Ratifiers is not a neutral
philosophical or historical claim that stands above the political fray;
rather, it is simply one of many possible interpretive stances in political
approach turns out to be virtually indistinguishable from other variants of New Originalism. See John
0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Interpretive Principles];
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) [hereinafter
McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods].
3. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (1997). For a thoughtful critique of Justice Scalia's originalist theory, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REv. 385
(2000).
4. For a forceful critique of New Originalism's pretensions of objectivity, see Richard R. Fallon,
Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2011).
5. On the problematic relationship between intellectual history and Originalism, see David A.
Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (2011).
On the shifting methods of intellectual history, see Anthony Grafton, The History ofIdeas: Precept
and Practice, 1950-2000 and Beyond, 67 J. HIST. IDEAS 1 (2006).
6. For a clear statement of this view, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, UnOriginalism's Law Without
Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541 (1998) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997)).
7. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 688 (2009); Caleb Nelson, Originalism
and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003).
8. See the discussion of new originalism, infra pp. 298-306.
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play at the time of the Founding.9
Ironically, the New Originalist emphasis on public meaning is hardly
new at all, but rests on an approach to constitutional interpretation first
advanced by Anti-Federalists more than two hundred years ago.'o In
contrast to New Originalists, the original champions of a public meaning
approach sought to empower the people and energize a form of living
constitutionalism. Thus, New Originalists have turned history on its head,
using a theory that was originally designed to restrain federal judges and
employed it to empower the federal judiciary. The Founding generation's
emphasis on public meaning was part of a tradition of popular
constitutionalism which sought something similar in spirit to modern
theories of a living constitution. In the hands of New Originalists, this
dynamic vision of constitutionalism has been transformed into a theory
designed to fix constitutional meaning at the Founding moment." The
supreme irony, however, is that rather than restore a lost Constitution, the
application of New Originalist methods would create an essentially Anti-
Federalist Constitution that never existed, a document that would have
been opposed by the Federalists who wrote and ratified the real
Constitution. 2
If one were genuinely interested in understanding how the Constitution
was read at the Founding moment one might expect New Originalists to
reconstruct the full range of interpretive practices in place at the Founding
Era." In reality, leading New Originalists have shown little interest in the
task of recovering Founding-era practices. Instead, New Originalists have
9. Philosopher Paul Grice's work has been cited by some new originalists, see the discussion of
semantic originalism, supra note 2. It is important to recognize the divisions among philosophers of
language regarding Grice. Even among supporters of Grice there are serious disagreements over how
to implement his ambitious philosophical project. On Grice, see H. P. GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF
WoRDS (1989). Although the field of philosophy of language may no longer be marked by a
"Homeric opposition" between followers of Grice and his critics, there are significant divisions within
the field: Simon Blackburn, Communication and Intention, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 458 (E. Craig ed., 1998), available at www.rep.routledge.com/article/UO06SECT3. For
overviews of criticism of Grice's program, see WILLIAM G. LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: A
CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 86-97 (2000); and MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 248-70 (2007).
10. See Justice Scalia's use of the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist Dissent of the Minority discussed
below, infra pp. 303-04.
11. The obvious exception to this critique is the theory of living Originalism. See Jack M. Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). In Balkin's terms, New
Originalists have taken a radical "protestant" theory of the Constitution and reinterpreted it for a
conservative "catholic" end. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN
AN UNJUST WORLD (2011).
12. See infra pp. 303-04.
13. See supra note 2.
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turned to fictional constructs such as fully informed readers or modem
theories of philosophy of language. Such approaches have created a
constitutional shell game in which contemporary political preferences are
shuffled around and made to appear to be part of an original meaning. 14
Similar methodological problems mar other strains of New Originalism.
Nothing better illustrates the simplistic view of history favored by New
Originalists than their naive reliance on old dictionaries. Thus, Lawrence
Solum praises Justice Scalia's decision in Heller to use historical
dictionaries to decode the meaning of the Constitution."
Originalist faith in simply scouring the dictionary as a shortcut around
the laborious process of doing genuine historical research rests on a
serious misunderstanding of the history of dictionaries. The first
American dictionaries were published after ratification. Early dictionaries,
including the first American dictionaries, were not compiled according to
the rules of modern lexicography."' These texts were idiosyncratic
products of their authors, who often had ideological and political agendas.
As a general rule, such dictionaries were more prescriptive than
descriptive. It is simply anachronistic to argue that one ought to consult
historical dictionaries from the Founding-Era to elucidate a set of fixed
linguistic facts that can be used to unravel the meaning of the text of the
Constitution.
The notion of using original methods to reconstruct original meaning at
first glance seems to gesture toward a genuinely historical method, but
advocates of this approach show no greater familiarity with Founding Era
practice than do other New Originalists. Indeed, John McGinnis and Mike
Rappaport, the leading champions of "original methods Originalism"
evince their own lack of familiarity with Founding-era history by simply
parroting Justice Scalia's pseudo-Originalist method, an approach that
invokes the authority of the Founders, while citing rules drawn from
14. In practice, the fictive readers conjured up by New Originalists are typically little more than
empty vessels into which modem originalists pour their own ideological biases. See Robert Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitutionalism, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 545 (2006).
15. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Barnett, supra note 2; Solum, District of
Columbia, supra note 2.
16. See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 227, 242-62 (1999). See
generally ANTHONY PAUL COWIE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF LEXICOGRAPHY (2009). America's first
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treatises written nearly a half century later."
McGinnis and Rappaport share John Yoo's view that the common
people's ignorance in the Founding rendered them effectively mute on
constitutional questions." This theory is, literally, idiotic in the
eighteenth-century sense; it treats ordinary Americans as if they had no
public voice-in other words, as idiots. Ignoring the real voices of
eighteenth century Americans is an important part of New Originalism's
methodological obfuscations.19 McGinnis and Rappaport make the
17. McGinnis and Rappaport endorse Justice Scalia's erroneous characterization of the Founding
Era's approach to preambles in Heller. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra note 2, at
767. Curiously, they do not provide a single Founding Era case to support this contention. Compare
this historical discussion of this issue, which cites no Founding Era sources, with the careful
explication of contemporary sources by historian David Thomas Konig. David Thomas Konig, Why
the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of
Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1295 (2009). The proper
interpretation of preambles was a central issue in Lloyd v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 197, 200-01 (N.J. 1807).
On the temporal oddities of Scalia's argument in Heller, see Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The
Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIo ST. L.J. 625, 639 (2008); Reva
B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191
(2008).
18. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1375 (1997);
Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2005)
(reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, TH4E PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)). For a devastating critique of Yoo's "history lite approach," see Martin S.
Flaherty, Case Studies in Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: The Future and Past of U.S.
Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2004) [hereinafter Flaherty, Case Studies];
and Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties
as "Supreme Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999) [Flaherty, History Right]. Many of
the problems Flaherty identifies with Yoo and other originalists stem from their simplistic approach to
history. Yoo's approach to historical materials resembles the approach of bright undergraduates who
have not yet made the transition to genuine historical thinking. Sam Wineburg, the leading authority
on history and learning, notes that true historical thinking involves the interrogation of texts, including
an appreciation that texts are complex historical constructions, not magic mirrors into the past. See
SAM WINEBURG, HISTORICAL THINKING AND OTHER UNNATURAL ACTS (2001). Ahistorical thinking,
Wineburg notes, typically assimilates historical evidence to preexisting frameworks rooted in
presentist concerns and reads historical texts without properly contextualizing them. This one
dimensional view of the past is typical of most textbooks, particularly those used in secondary
schools. WINEBURG, supra, at 74-82. Yoo's reductive summary of GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969) is a case in point. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C.
Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 933-4 (2003). Compare this one-
dimensional account with the way historians have read Wood's important work. See Forum: The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews, 44 WM. &
MARY Q. 549 (1987).
19. In eighteenth-century English the term "idiot" not only referred to the legal concept of a
person of diminished mental capacity, but it might have also signified an ordinary person without
learning, or a private person without a public voice. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010),
available at http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/91049. In his early dictionary of "hard words," Edward
Phillips notes that idiot "(in Greek) properly signifies a private Man, who has no publick Office;
among the Latins it is also taken for an unlearned or unskillful Person." EDWARD PHILLIPS, THE NEW
WORLD OF WORDS (London, 7th ed. 1720). For other contemporaneous usages to the Constitution,
see JAMES FORDYCE, SERMONS TO A YOUNG WOMAN 178 (Philadelphia, M. Carey 1787); and
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following extraordinary claim about the Founding Era:
[T]he people decided whether to ratify the Constitution based on
an explanation of its meaning by those with legal knowledge.
Pamphleteers of all kinds wrote lengthy explications of the
Constitution precisely so that the people could be informed. It is
not too much to say that they translated the condensed, sometimes
technical language of the legal document into familiar language
more easily accessible to the electorate as a whole. Moreover, the
people did not vote directly on the Constitution, just as they did
not vote directly on the passage of statutes. They instead relied on
their representatives-who were more likely to be either schooled
in legal understanding or able to consult more learned
colleagues.20
This notion of constitutional idiocy at the root of New Originalism is
premised on a profound ignorance of Founding-Era history. The state
ratification debates in Pennsylvania, New York, or Massachusetts, in
particular, provide many examples of common folk who took an active
part in ratification.2 1 There was no sharp line separating those with, from
those without legal knowledge. In the era of the Constitution legal
knowledge existed along a continuum. At one extreme were figures such
as James Wilson who were steeped in the classic texts of Anglo-American
law. The middle of this spectrum included men such as William Findley
who had read Blackstone, but not internalized his method. At a more
popular level, William Manning, a tavern keeper, gained his knowledge of
the law from the popular press. Among members of the lesser gentry it
was not uncommon to find individuals with some knowledge of the law.
Thomas Bourn, a delegate from Cape Cod, was typical of many delegates
to the state conventions in this regard. When the town of Sandwich
proposed binding its delegates with specific voting instructions on
PELATIAH WEBSTER, POLITICAL ESSAYS 343 (Philadelphia, Joseph Crukshank 1791). In Greek
political philosophy the term idiotes described a person who took no part in the public life of the city.
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 35, 54 (1971); DAVID MILLER, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2003).
20. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra 2, at 771 (citing John C. Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1375 (1997)). Beginning with Jackson Turner
Main's pioneering study, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (1961), there
have been three generations of historians who have documented the vitality of the popular debate over
the Constitution. For the most recent study to validate this conclusion, see PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2011).
21. All of these sources are now available in authoritative modern editions. The state ratification
debates of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York are available in 2, 4-7, 19-23 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John. P. Kaminsky et al.
eds., 1976) [hereinafter DHRC].
300 [Vol. 23:295
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ratification, Bourn threatened to resign, reminding his fellow townsmen
that to deprive delegates of their voice would be to literally render them
idiots. "Under the restrictions with which your delegates are fettered," he
wrote "the greatest ideot [sic] might answer your purpose as well, as the
greatest man." 2 2
The notion of constitutional idiocy is central to virtually every brand of
Originalism, new and old. The idiotic theory also enables some New
Originalists to side step dealing with the actual beliefs of Americans and
substitute the beliefs of a fictive reader, effectively turning constitutional
interpretation into an act of historical ventriloquism. 23
When combined with the false Originalist assumption that a consensus
existed on matters of constitutional interpretation and belief, the idea of
constitutional idiocy allows Originalists to cherry-pick their quotes from a
narrow range of sources, and then pronounce those views typical of the
Founding Era. Indeed, in Heller, Justice Scalia used an Anti-Federalist
text written by the "Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority" as one of the
keys to unlocking the meaning of the Second Amendment. His
methodology makes it easy for him to take a text articulating the beliefs of
the dissent of the minority of a single state ratification convention and
transform it into a proxy for public meaning. In the wacky world of New
Originalism, dissent becomes assent, minorities become majorities, and
the interpretive method of the Anti-Federalist losers supplants the
methods of the Federalist winners. Such creative rewriting of the past
makes for interesting alternate histories, but it is not a serious scholarly
methodology for understanding the historical meaning of the Constitution.
It is an exercise in law office history cloaked in Originalist garb.24
22. 5 id. at 1020.
23. On the importance of fictive readers to new originalist practice, see the work of Lawson and
Barnett, supra note 2.
24. Cornell, supra note 17. Originalist scholarship is a paradigmatic example of "law office
history." In contrast to scholarly history, law office history is characterized by several recurring
problems: it is typically result-oriented, it shows an appalling lack of familiarity with Founding Era
history and historiography, and it approaches historical texts in an anachronistic manner. For critiques
of various aspects of law office history, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM,
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); Matthew J.
Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479 (2008);
Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523,
523-29 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119
(1965); and Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003).
Originalism often reads as if it were a science fiction alternate history, a world in which the Anti-
Federalists, not the Federalists wrote the Constitution. On this genre, see Gavriel Rosenfield, Why Do
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Solum's theory of semantic Originalism invokes the authority of
philosopher Paul Grice. Yet, even if Grice provided the best model for
Originalists, one would still need the methods of intellectual history to do
a rigorous survey of actual Founding Era linguistic behaviors. Moreover,
it would make more sense to begin with post-Gricean scholarship and one
of the major revisions of Grice's theory. John Searle's notion that we
must look at intention plus convention provides one model. Another
promising model is provided by Scott Soames and his theory of the
"pragmatic enrichment" of meaning. Soames highlights the philosophical
problems with textualism and semantic theories of legal meaning. In
either case, one would still need to pay attention to issues of intent. The
notion that the meaning of a legal text can be determined without
reference to intent seems at odds with the views of leading philosophers
of language working on legal questions.2 5
Moving beyond Originalism's idiotic theory of the Constitution and its
false notion of interpretive consensus necessarily leads to questions about
popular constitutionalism in the Founding Era. Although interest in
popular constitutionalism has blossomed among legal scholars, the subject
of popular modes of constitutional interpretation during the Founding Era
has not drawn much scholarly notice.2 6  Understanding how the
Constitution was read by different groups in the Founding Era, including
ordinary Americans, is the essential starting point for any serious
historical inquiry into original meaning.2 7
25. Although a full examination of the problems with Solum's theory of semantic originalism,
supra note 2, are beyond the scope of this essay a few observations are worth making. Grice's entire
project was to link sentence meaning with his intentionalist model of speaker meaning, so any
historical application of Grice would require an ambitious scholarly inquiry: a survey of old
dictionaries would hardly begin to meet this requirement. Applying Grice leads to something akin to
Geertzian thick description. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (1973). On
recent historians' debt to Geertz, see William H. Sewell Jr., Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History:
From Synchrony to Transformation, 59 REPRESENTATIONS 35 (1997). If one were looking to raid
philosophy for a model, Searle's notion of intention plus convention seems a far better fit for the
project of constitutional interpretation. SEARLE, supra note 9. Alternatively recent work in pragmatics
offers another model for originalism. For a sketch of how a neo-Gricean approach informed by
"pragmatic enrichment" could bring some rigor to legal interpretation, see the introduction to
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN LAW (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
26. For a general discussion of the idea of popular constitutionalism, see LARRY KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); and
Symposium, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 81 CH. KENT
L. REV 809 (2006).
27. Most forms of New Originalism are clumsy and unreflective exercises in reader-response
criticism aimed at uncovering how the Constitution would have been read. For an overview of the
evolution of reader-response methodology and a brief discussion of the problems of using fictive
readers in place of actual ones, see Philip Goldstein, Reader-Response Theory and Criticism, in THE
302 [Vol. 23:295
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It is easy to understand why popular modes of interpretation would be
almost invisible to modern constitutional scholarship. 28 Recovering how
the Constitution might have been read by ordinary Americans requires
moving beyond the familiar canonical texts consulted by Originalist
scholarship. In essence, one must write a constitutional history from the
bottom up to complement the more traditional top-down court-centered
narratives of this period. 29 Exploring constitutional history from the
bottom up means expanding the range of sources consulted for
establishing constitutional meaning. Looking at constitutional history
through this lens, one might learn as much from a popular play, a short
newspaper squib, or tavern keeper's musings, as one might learn from an
elite text such as The Federalist or the decisions of the Marshall Court.30
When one moves beyond the debate between elite Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, or Jefferson and Hamilton's arguments over strict and loose
construction, a much more fundamental division within the Founding
generation becomes visible: a conflict between elite and popular
approaches to constitutional interpretation. Only when this aspect of the
JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY THEORY AND CRITICISM (Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth,
& Imre Szeman eds., 2d ed. 2005). On the relevance of this method to history, see J.G.A. POCOCK,
VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1985); and Martyn P. Thompson, Reception Theory and the Interpretation of
Historical Meaning, 32 HIST. & THEORY 248 (1993). For a concise overview of the empirical
problems of applying these insights to actual historical texts in eighteenth-century Britain, see Ian
Jackson, Approaches to the History of Readers and Reading in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 47 HiST.
JOURNAL 1041 (2004). A reader response model does make sense as an alternative to Originalism.
The goal would be to determine how the Constitution was read by different groups in American
society during the Founding Era and decide which of these diverse readings ought to have the greatest
legal weight in modem constitutional interpretation. Recovering past reading practice is, however,
among the most notoriously difficult historical problems faced by intellectual historians. For an effort
to chart what such a reader-response model might look like, see SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER
FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999)
[hereinafter CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS].
28. For two views of the Founders' views of interpretive method which focus largely on
Madison, see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMM.
77 (1988); and Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. COMM.
159 (1996). The important pathbreaking essay on Originalism, H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985), explores Anti-Federalist and
Federalist interpretive practice, but treats each group as essentially monolithic and draws no
distinctions between popular and elite thought. Scholarship since Powell's pioneering work has
stressed the diversity of Anti-Federalist thought. See CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 27.
29. On the notion of social history and history from the bottom up, see Jesse Lemisch, The
American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up, in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (Barton J. Bernstein ed., 1967). Although constitutional historians have not
yet embraced history from the bottom up in a systematic fashion, legal historians have been engaged
in exploring legal history from the bottom up for more than a generation. See, e.g., William Forbath,
Hendrik Hartog & Martha Minow, Introduction Legal Histories from Below, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 759.
30. Grafton, supra note 5.
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Founding debate is restored to its prominence can we begin to understand
the dynamics of the original debate over Originalism.
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE FOUNDING ERA: THE PEOPLE'S
CONSTITUTION v. THE LAWYER'S CONSTITUTION
One of the most fundamental divisions in Founding-Era interpretive
practice has been effectively invisible to modern scholars. Proponents of a
lawyer's constitution clashed with champions of a people's constitution.
Spokesmen for the former believed that constitutions ought to be
interpreted according to the rules laid down by Anglo-American jurists
such as Blackstone. Advocates for the people's constitution argued that
legal texts should be interpreted according to the ordinary rules of the
English language. This latter theory was also distinctly hostile to judicial
review, placing its faith in the people themselves, acting through popular
institutions such as the legislature, jury, and for the most radical
champions of this theory, the militia and crowd. This basic tension
between the lawyer's constitution and the people's constitution has gone
unnoticed by most legal scholars because modern constitutional law
focuses so heavily on federal case law, giving little attention to state
cases, and even less attention to popular writing from the Founding Era.
When one looks at these neglected sources the vibrancy of popular
constitutionalism in the Founding Era comes into sharp focus.
As the tempest over ratification was raging, playwright Samuel Low
completed his political farce, The Politician Outwitted.31 Staged in 1789,
the play is set amidst the larger political tumult generated by the lively
debate in New York over the Constitution. The play explores a number of
themes relevant to understanding constitutional and political conflict in
the new nation.32 At one point a Federalist character named "Trueman"
expresses joy over the news that Massachusetts had become the latest
"federal pillar," a reference to a common architectural metaphor for
ratification." Barely able to contain his joy, he declares that ratification of
the Constitution was "the grand desideratum of my wishes." 34 The
somewhat pretentious turn of phrase prompts an angry response from his
Anti-Federalist opponent, "Loveyet," who protests that he does not care
31. SAMUEL Low, THE POLITICIAN OUTWITTED (New York, J. Lawson 1790).
32. See Maxwell Bloomfield, Constitutional Values and the Literature of the Early Republic, 11
J. AM. CULTURE 53 (2004),
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"a fig for your latin and literature!"" With political tempers still smarting
from another Federalist victory, the Anti-Federalist character launches
into a diatribe against the underlying legal and constitutional vision of his
Federalist opponents. Accusing Federalists of lawyerly cunning and craft,
he complains that they have over-awed and taken "advantage of our weak
side."36 Echoing a common Anti-Federalist complaint, he charged the
Federalists with trying to "cram this unconstitutional bolus down our
throats, with Latin."37 Federalists were a "vile junto of perfidious
politicians" whose goal is "to latin us out of our liberties."3 Low's play
chronicled a growing tension in American culture between two opposing
legal cultures a conflict between the elite discourse of judges and lawyers,
inflected by Latin and shaped by the traditions of Anglo-American
jurisprudence, and a more popular constitutional discourse hostile to that
tradition.
It is not difficult to find examples of popular spokesmen voicing
complaints very similar to the characters in Low's political farce. When
Amos Singletary, an Anti-Federalist farmer from a strongly Shaysite
region of western Massachusetts, rose in the Massachusetts ratification
convention, he denounced the Constitution in a language that closely
tracked the metaphor chosen by Low.
These lawyers, and men of learning, and monied men, that talk so
finely and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor
illiterate people swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress
themselves; they expect to be the managers of this Constitution
and get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and
then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great
Leviathan, Mr. President, yes, just as the whale swallowed up
Jonah.3 9
In contrast to the Latinate discourse of the law, Singletary's language
was inflected by a Protestant plain style. He drew on the Biblical story of
Jonah to frame his critique of the Constitution. Singletary was hardly





39. 6 DHRC, supra note 21, at 1346-47. Illiteracy in this context connotes the absence of learning
(i.e., not an inability to read or write). For a discussion of Singletary's speech in this context, see




Cornell: The People's Constitution vs. The Lawyer's Constitution
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Barrington, Massachusetts, Anti-Federalist John Bacon, a state
representative and a candidate for the Massachusetts state ratification
convention, charged that the Constitution was "a government for great
men & law[y]ers."4 0 The contrast between the Latinate culture of the law
and the popular Protestant plain style of Singletary and other Anti-
Federalists struck a resonant chord in Massachusetts.4 1
Criticism of lawyers in Massachusetts was not new. At roughly the
same time that Shays's Rebellion rocked western Massachusetts,
Benjamin Austin published a scathing attack on lawyers in a pamphlet
entitled "The Pernicious Practice of the Law."42 Writing as "Honestus,"
Austin compared the chicanery of lawyers with the practices of "Romish
priests in matters of religion." 43 In the strongly Protestant culture of
eighteenth-century Massachusetts, such a comparison was hardly
flattering. Champions of popular constitutionalism shared a common
belief that citizens need not have much, if any, formal training in law to
understand the meaning of constitutional and legal texts, which ought to
be interpreted according to their plain meaning. An important
consequence of this belief was the view that judges and courts should not
be the final arbiters of constitutional meaning. Rather than adopt a court-
centric approach, popular constitutionalism was deeply suspicious of
ceding so much authority to lawyers and judges. For some, the legislature,
not the judiciary, was the proper arbiter of constitutional meaning. For the
most radical champions of this theory, plebeian populists, only truly local
institutions such as the jury, the militia, and even, when necessary, the
crowd, retained the authority to decide what the Constitution meant.44
40. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Henry Van Schaack (Nov. 28, 1787), in 6 DHRC, supra
note 21, at 1035; see also A Countryman, AM. HERALD (Boston), January 21, 1788; From the
Independent Chronicle, AM. HERALD (Boston), Jan. 7, 1788; Peregrine, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 19,
1788. In New York, the Anti-Federalist author Brutus, Jr., used a similar language. 6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 39 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 2007).
41. As a general rule, Federalists were much more likely to cite classical authorities than Anti-
Federalists. Opponents of the Constitution were also more likely to cite the Bible than Federalists. See
Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence ofEuropean Writers on Late Eighteenth Century American
Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SC. REv. 184 (1984). For other examples of the Protestant "plain
style" in Anti-Federalist writing, see the New York Essays ofA Plebeian, in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 40, at 128; and A Countryman, in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 128,
supra note 40, at 69.
42. HONESTuS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW (Boston, Thomas
Adams & John Nourse 1786).
43. Id.
44. Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey
Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006). For a sweeping discussion of popular political thought
in early American history, see RONALD FORMISANO, FOR THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN POPULIST
306 [Vol. 23:295
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss2/2
Cornell
William Manning, a tavern keeper from Billerica, Massachusetts,
echoed this popular critique of the law.45 He chose a different metaphor to
capture his own suspicious about the new Constitution. Manning's fears
about the new frame of government stemmed as much from the methods
of constitutional interpretation associated with the lawyer's constitution as
from the actual text of the document. Manning compared the Constitution
to "a Fiddle, with but few Strings." The language of the Constitution
would allow the better sort to "play any tune upon it they pleased."4 6
These ambiguities would be exploited by those trained in the methods of
the lawyer's constitution. The starting point for any understanding of
Manning's constitutional vision, and other popular voices, was an
inchoate conception of class struggle. Manning saw the new nation
divided into two classes: the few and the many. In his writings, Manning
repeatedly employed a language very similar to Singletary and other
supporters of popular constitutionalism, lashing out at the danger posed
by the "craft and cunning arts" of those in power, and singled lawyers for
particularly harsh criticism for their obfuscations.47
Elite legal culture in the Founding Era, particularly among Federalists,
was designed to shore up a basic distinction between law and politics, to
isolate a range of issues, particularly economic ones, from the vicissitudes
of popular politics. 4 8 Proponents of popular constitutionalism generally
sought to eliminate this distinction, expanding the scope of the political,
exposing more economic activity to political control.49
Elite defenses of the law resisted such efforts and sought to separate
law and politics and provide greater security for economic activity.
Stability and predictability were especially important to a commercial
economy. One can see the outlines of the ideology of legal elites in the
responses written to challenge the anti-lawyer rhetoric of Honestus. A
MOVEMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 1850s (2008). For an interesting but somewhat episodic
effort to look at aspects of popular constitutionalism in the period between the American Revolution
and the Civil War, see CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008).
45. WILLIAM MANNING, THE KEY OF LIBERTY: SHOWING THE CAUSES WHY A FREE
GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS FAILED AND A REMEDY AGAINST IT 148, 180 (Sean Wilentz ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1799).
46. Id. at 148.
47. Id. at 146.
48. On the importance of this distinction to elite legal thought in this period, see WILLIAM E.
NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2000).
49. On popular constitutional thought, particularly its alternative vision of the relationship
between politics, property, and the economy, see TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: "THE
PEOPLE," THE FOUNDERS, AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007).
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writer calling himself "Zenas" defended traditional legal culture against
the populist tirades of "scribblers" or "Gazetteer politicians," slurs that
expressly linked the combative world of the popular press with anti-
lawyer ideology."o The contrast between the lawyer's constitution, which
was shaped by leather-bound treatises, and the people's constitution, a
world of anonymous newspaper essays and tavern conversations, could
hardly be starker. Zenas defended the elite tradition of law, reminding his
readers that men learned in the law were essential in any free government,
and particularly necessary in America's new constitutional order.
Champions of popular constitutionalism, he argued, defended a misguided
ideal of constitutional simplicity. Zenas disputed this nafve view, arguing
that the reverse was true. "Systems of government become complex and
increase in their complexity in an exact proportion to the quantity of
freedom enjoyed by the subject.""1 Moreover, the creation of clear forms,
definitions, and rules of legal construction-the primary goal of legal
education-was itself designed to reduce the arbitrariness and
capriciousness of the application of the law to specific cases. If true
liberty was the absence of arbitrary authority, the lawyer's constitution
served the interests of liberty far better than the mutable democratic vision
of law associated with the people's constitution defended by Honestus.
One of the most spirited defenses of the "lawyer's constitution" came
from Samuel Willard Bridgham in An Oration on the Propriety of
Introducing the Science of Jurisprudence into a Course of Classical
Education, which was written at roughly the same time as Manning was
writing The Key of Liberty. A lawyer and politician who eventually
became the mayor of Providence, Rhode Island, Bridgham defended a
distinctly Federalist vision of law that was the mirror image of the class-
conscious rhetoric used by Manning and Singletary. Bridgham sought to
strengthen and defend the lawyer's constitution against the attacks of
Manning and others like him.52
Bridgham made a plea for broadening classical higher education to
include a course on jurisprudence. The Oration was designed to buttress
existing class distinctions, not level them. Firming up the link between
classical education and legal education would solidify the rule of a
50. Zenas, INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), April 27, 1786.
51. Id.
52. SAMUEL WILLARD BIDGHAM, AN ORATION ON THE PROPRIETY OF INTRODUCING THE
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virtuous elite." Bridgham naturally began his Oration with an epithet
from Blackstone. No legal thinker was more important for supporters of
the lawyer's constitution than Blackstone, whose magisterial
Commentaries became a standard reference work for both the meaning of
the common law and the methods of legal analysis.5 4
Bridgham was certainly among those who put his faith in the wisdom of
Blackstone and the lawyerly tradition of Anglo-American law. In his
oration he invoked the "wisdom of ages, improved and collected in those
many volumes of English jurisprudence."" A command of this material,
he noted, "requires a laborious investigation." Moreover, he suggested to
his audience that it was "preposterous in the extreme" to believe that a
"man can explain statutes he knows nothing about, can comment upon
texts of which he is totally ignorant, or can remedy defects in laws of
which he has no knowledge." Sounding a familiar Federalist theme,
Bridgham warned against the danger of "political jealousy," particularly
the type sown in the people by "ignorant Americans."5 No group had
done more harm in this regard than the original Anti-Federalist opponents
of the Constitution. In short, Bridgham viewed the beliefs of men like
Manning and Singletary as precisely the type of ideas that had nearly
plunged the nation into "agitation and civil commotion.""
It is tempting to see this divide as a simple dichotomy separating elites
from the people, but the historical reality is even more complex. It would
be far more accurate to view the conflict over legal interpretation as
existing along a spectrum in which elite culture shaded gradually into a
more popular plebeian culture. At one extreme stood men such as Samuel
53. On the role of Greek and Roman culture in early American legal culture, see CAROLINE
WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF CLASSICISM: ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME IN AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL LIFE, 1780-1910 (2002).
54. See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1996); see also
Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American
Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 184 (1984).
55. Prior to the American Revolution, there were at least one thousand copies of Blackstone in
American libraries. The first American edition of Blackstone, published by Robert Bell in
Philadelphia in 1771-1772, had a list of subscribers that included such leading figures as John Adams,
John Jay, James Wilson, and St. George Tucker. Along with Montesquieu, Blackstone was one of the
most frequently cited authorities during Ratification. While the importance of Blackstone to the
constitutional thought of the Founding Era is reasonably well established, what has not attracted as
much notice is the role of different readings of Blackstone in the struggle to define early American
constitutionalism. Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study
ofIntellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731 (1976). For the persistence of Blackstone's influence,
see M. H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2010).
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Willard Bridgham who were firmly committed to the methods of the
lawyer's constitution. In the middle stood many self-made lawyers who
had some familiarity with Blackstone's writings. Further along this
continuum were moderates who believed that the law required no special
knowledge, and at the extreme were plebeian populists who believed the
voice of the people could be spontaneously gathered by juries or even
mobs.
The spectrum running from elite supporters of the lawyer's constitution
to popular champions of the people's constitution included a broad
constitutional middle ground, one populated by a host of new types of
legal actors who emerged after the American Revolution. This legal
middle ground included men such as the weaver-turned-politician
William Findley and pseudonymous authors such as New York's
Brutus." In this constitutional middle ground, men with some exposure to
the writings of Blackstone, such as Findley and Brutus, championed a
constitutional theory of public meaning that sought to level the
constitutional playing field by depriving lawyers of an undue advantage.
Champions of this public meaning/ordinary language vision of popular
constitutionalism also hoped to liberate American law from the last
vestiges of the monarchism and aristocratic corruption of the English
common law.59 In their view, the protection of popular liberty required no
Latin, not much Blackstone, and no recourse to the established
conventions of Anglo-American law. Proponents of this view generally
opposed the notion that the courts were the final arbiters of meaning,
preferring to look to the jury or the legislature as the ultimate authority on
constitutional meaning. Pursuing the logic of this democratic theory to its
most radical conclusion, some advocates of popular constitutionalism
dispensed with the notion that written constitutional texts were sacrosanct.
In their view, constitutions were not substitutes for the direct action of the
people themselves. Rather than trust in their state legislatures or even
their state constitutions, these plebeian populists preferred to trust the
people themselves acting directly as the jury, the militia, or, even if
necessary, the mob."o
58. See infra pp. 313-14.
59. See CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 27.
60. Id. at ch. 3.
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PUBLIUS AND BRUTUS DEBATE THE LAWYER'S CONSTITUTION
Although a sea of ink was spilled in the spirited debate over the
Constitution, relatively little attention was devoted to the issue of how the
proposed Constitution ought to be interpreted if it were adopted. Anti-
Federalists devoted most of their energy to attacking the Constitution, and
showed little interest in exploring what might happen if the Constitution
were ratified. Similarly, Federalists spent most of their time rebutting
specific Anti-Federalist criticisms and defending the Constitution, and
hence they did not devote much attention to articulating a systematic
theory of constitutional interpretation. Even the most far-sighted and
theoretically sophisticated authors, including Publius and Brutus, paid
little heed to this issue, one that would become a major point of
contention in the decade after ratification. Still, Brutus and Publius did
touch briefly on this issue within the context of their debate over the
powers of the judiciary."
The identity of the Anti-Federalist author Brutus remains a mystery.
Recent scholarship favors the New York merchant Melancton Smith.62
New York's Anti-Federalists, including Smith, were more provincial than
their Federalist opponents, and they lacked the same level of education,
family connections, and wealth. Not surprisingly, when they approached
the law, they did so from a more populist perspective. Rather than seek to
expand the power of judges, Anti-Federalists such as Smith sought to
limit judicial authority and enhance the power of the jury.
Brutus clearly had a basic grasp of texts such as Blackstone's
Commentaries. Indeed, Brutus was eager to show off his knowledge of
the great English jurist. Yet, a few quotations from the learned English
jurist did not make Brutus a doctrinaire Blackstonian in matters of
constitutional interpretation. Brutus may have had a passing familiarity
61. This important discussion has not merited the careful attention it deserves. In his important
article on Originalism, H. Jefferson Powell discusses the disagreement between Publius and Brutus. I
think Powell overstates the degree to which Publius adopted a strictly textualist approach to
constitutional interpretation. Publius adopted an orthodox Blackstonian view that was strongly, but
not exclusively, textualist. Another discussion of this debate mistakenly characterizes Brutus as a
supporter of Blackstonian orthodoxy. Robert G. Natelson, for example, attributes beliefs to Brutus
that the author was actually attacking. Robert G. Natelson, The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007). The most historically
accurate treatment of this debate is DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 (2005).
62. For a useful overview of the debate over the identity of Brutus, see Editor's Note, in 19
DHRC, supra note 21, at 103-4. On the differences between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist elite in
New York, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 61, at 218.
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with Blackstone, but he was not steeped in the Commentaries and
certainly did not defer to its wisdom in all matters. Rather than embark on
a detailed course of legal study, Brutus and others like him believed that a
general acquaintance with a few widely reprinted law texts was all that
any citizen needed. Accordingly, Brutus confessed his own "want of
capacity to give that full and minute explanation of all of the legal
terminology used in the Constitution."6 3 Indeed, as was true for many
Anti-Federalists, Brutus' vision of the law was as profoundly shaped by
popular religious ideas, as it was by Anglo-American jurisprudence. 64
In his assault on the judiciary, Brutus sounded many familiar Anti-
Federalist themes, including the dangers of consolidation and the absence
of a bill of rights.6' Brutus also worried that the federal judiciary would
become an engine of despotism by aiding the process of consolidation.
Brutus feared the type of men who would populate the judiciary and the
methods they would use to interpret the new Constitution. Judges
following the precepts of Blackstone would, Brutus argued, gradually
expand the powers of the central government and would support the
interests of the few, at the expense of the many.
The Federalist response to the types of fears raised by Brutus is
instructive. In Federalist No. 83, Publius dismissed Anti-Federalist fears,
noting that "the rules of legal interpretation are rules of
COMMONSENSE, adopted by the courts in the construction of the
laws."66 Taken in isolation, this comment might seem to suggest that
63. Brutus cites Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis [On the Law of War and Peace], a standard text
for understanding international law, particularly the law of treaties, and Blackstone's Commentaries, a
standard guide for understanding the common law and interpreting statutes. XI BRUTUS, reprinted in
2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 419, 420, 422 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
64. Id. at 386-87. See also Donald S. Lutz, European Works Read and Cited by the American
Founding Generation, in A PREFACE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 159-64 (1992). On popular
Anti-Federalist debt to religious discourse, see Stephan Marini, Religious Tests, Constitutions, and
"Christian Nation ", in RONALD HOFFMAN & PETER J. ALBERT, RELIGION IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE
(1994).
65. The Federalist was clearly the most nuanced and theoretically rigorous defense of the
Constitution. Assessing its immediate impact has been more difficult. For an excellent overview of
these issues and exploration of the rhetorical strategies of The Federalist, see Todd Estes, The Voices
ofPublius and the Strategies ofPersuasion in THE FEDERALIST, 28 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 523-
58 (2008). See also ALBERT FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS: A READING OF THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS (1984); MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, LIBERTY'S BLUEPRINT: How MADISON AND
HAMILTON WROTE THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, DEFINED THE CONSTITUTION, AND MADE DEMOCRACY
SAFE FOR THE WORLD (2008). On Anti-Federalism, see CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 27
at chs. 2-3.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Letter from Timothy Pickering to
Charles Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787), in CHARLES W. UPHAM, 2 LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING 359-60,
366-67 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1873).
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Publius was advocating something like a public meaning approach, a view
that should have pleased critics such as Brutus, who favored this method.
One must recall that documents such as The Federalist were political texts
and must be read in context. Indeed, the problem of interpreting this
particular passage illustrates many of the methodological flaws of the
New Originalism. One must consider both Publius' intention, and the
variety of possible audience responses, to arrive at an adequate
understanding of this passage.67
Indeed, there is good reason to conclude that this rejoinder and its glib
dismissal of the problem of interpretation was disingenuous at best, and
perhaps deliberately deceptive.68 If one looks at all of Hamilton's
contributions to The Federalist, and contemporary responses to Publius, a
more accurate understanding of his argument with Brutus emerges. In
contrast to the notion of constitutional idiocy embraced by modern
Originalists, the historical evidence suggests that contemporary readers
were quite astute and savvy, at least about discerning the ideological
leanings of authors, including Publius. One Anti-Federalist author who
was not taken in by such rhetoric, "[a] Countryman from Dutchess
County," warned his readers that "[t]he Federalist, as he terms himself, or
Publius, puts me in mind of some of the gentlemen of the long robe" who
used the language of the law to befuddle and distract common folk."
As far as constitutional interpretation was concerned, the following
passage is more typical of Publius:
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents,
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from
the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and
wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must
unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand
long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of
them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society who
will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the
stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the
ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still
67. On the methods of reader-response criticism, see supra note 28.
68. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 50 (1999).
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smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite
knowledge.70
A learned judicial elite, well trained in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
was not a threat to liberty but rather one of its essentials bulwarks.7 I
Brutus did not share Publius' faith in a learned judiciary. He saw
himself as a spokesman for a rising middling class. He not only rejected
the elitism of New York Federalists such as Hamilton, but he self-
consciously distanced himself from the more radical democratic elements
among the Anti-Federalists, the type of men who had rallied to Daniel
Shays or poured into the streets of Carlisle Pennsylvania to mete out
punishment to their Federalists opponents during ratification.7 2 Brutus
occupied a sort of constitutional middle ground between these two
extremes.
In his discussion of the problem of constitutional interpretation, Brutus
provided a fairly lucid summary of the starting point of orthodox
Blackstonian method. Brutus had clearly schooled himself well enough in
Blackstone to summarize the first step of this method. Constitutional texts
ought to be interpreted according to the plain public meaning of the text.
The first of Blackstone's rules would have pleased Brutus: "words are
generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification;
not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and
popular use."73 Brutus and Publius both accepted the first of Blackstone's
rules, which enjoined judges to read legal texts in light of the common use
of words. But this type of inquiry, which was the end goal for Brutus, was
simply the starting point for Blackstone, Publius, and other champions of
the lawyer's constitution. 4
Brutus rejected several core features of orthodox Blackstonian
method-including its emphasis on discovering legislative intent. The
search for an original intent was especially dangerous because it opened
up all of the evils of the lawyer's constitution. Legislative intent, of
course, was not simply the subjective meaning of laws as they were
understood by the particular legislator who crafted a specific law. The
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamiltion); I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*59-61.
71. To be sure, it was not just elite Federalists who supported this vision of law. Many leading
Anti-Federalists, such as Elbridge Gerry, supported orthodox Blackstonian method. On this point, see
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946-54 (statement of Rep. Elbridge Gerry).
72. CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 27, at ch. 3.
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concept of legislative intent in Blackstone was a complex legal construct
that was deduced from the application of a clear set of legal rules of
construction. Blackstonian method recognized that memories faded and
motives could lead individuals to misstate their own intent.15 To avoid
these problems, Anglo-American law had developed a clear set of
procedures to ascertain the meaning of legal texts. These rules were
summarized early in Blackstone's Commentaries. Thus, Blackstone
offered this general advice to judges:
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the
legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law
was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs
are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and
consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.76
These general rules were followed by a series of specific interpretive
principles. It was these standard techniques of the lawyer's constitution
that worried Brutus, who feared that "the judicial power will operate to
effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner."77
Precisely because matters of constitutional interpretation were among the
subtlest means of expanding the scope of federal power, judicial power
was all the more insidious and potentially dangerous.
It is easy to understand why Blackstone's method worried Brutus. A
paramount interpretive principle relied on preambles as a means of
decoding legislative intent.
If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their
75. For a useful discussion about the difference between subjective intent and legislative intent,
see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REv.
1502 (2006); and Powell, supra note 28. Contrary to the claims of New Originalists and Justice
Scalia, the orthodox judicial model of interpreting statues and constitutional provisions in the
Founding Era was intentionalist. This concept of intent was not a subjective psychological or
mentalist notion, but was a rule-based concept. Although the plain meaning of the text was the
starting point for recovering intent, judges also employed a contextualist mode of analysis designed to
identify the spirit of the law, including the specific evil that the legislation had sought to remedy. For
a good illustration of how this was applied in the early republic, see Martin v. Commonwealth, 1
Mass. 347 (1805). In that case, the Court stated the rule in this way: "[i]n construing statutes, the great
object is to discover from the words, the subject matter, the mischiefs contemplated, and the remedies
proposed, what was the true meaning and design of the legislature." Id. at 391. The judges in this case
turned to the preamble as a guide. See id. at 362-63, 391-393. Needless to say Justice Scalia provides
no examples of Founding judges following his bizarre rule about preambles. Scalia obviously did not
even read the full text of the Pennsylvania Constitution very carefully, since it enjoins legislators to
use the preamble to articulate the reasons for enacting a law. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 15 (enjoining that
"the reasons and motives for making such laws shall be fully and clearly expressed in the
preambles").
76. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-61.
77. Brutus XII, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 63, at 420.
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meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to
compare a word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous,
equivocal, or intricate. Thus the proeme, or preamble, is often
called in to help the construction of an act of parliament. Of the
same nature and use is the comparison of a law with other laws
that are made by the same legislator, that have some affinity with
the subject, or that expressly relate to the same point."
Blackstone's second rule was particularly troubling for Brutus because of
the great weight it placed upon preambles. According to Blackstone, the
preamble or proeme described the purpose of an enactment or
constitutional provision.7 9 Brutus recognized that the new Constitution's
preamble could easily be converted by judges into a virtual blank check
for the expansion of federal power if one used orthodox Blackstonian
rules of construction. "If the end of the government is to be learned from
these words," Brutus warned, "it is obvious it has in view every object
which is embraced by any government."so Given Blackstonian methods, it
was inevitable that "the courts, therefore, will establish this as a principle
in expounding the constitution, and will give every part of it such an
explanation, as will give latitude to every department under it, to take
cognizance of every matter."8 1
The final rule in Blackstone's method was equally troubling to Brutus
who saw it as yet another example of the dangers of the lawyer's
constitution: "Lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering
the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering
the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact
it." 82
Blackstone's suggestion to look into the reason and the spirit of the law
could provide judges with a means of expanding their power and reading
new meanings into the law. Brutus noted the grave danger that would
flow from court's interpreting the Constitution in terms of its reason and
spirit:
This court will be authorized to decide upon the meaning of the
constitution, and that, not only according to the natural and
obvious meaning of the words, but also according to the spirit and
78. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-61.
79. Brutus XII, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 63, at 421.
80. Id. at 424.
81. Id.
82. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-61.
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intention of it. In the exercise of this power they will not be
subordinate to, but above the legislature."
Brutus also feared the Constitution's grant of equity jurisdiction,
believing that equitable jurisprudence was especially open-ended and,
thus, dangerous. Following Blackstonian rules of equity would authorize
the federal courts to read the Constitution in a way that went beyond the
plain meaning of the words. Irritated by Anti-Federalist attacks on
orthodox Blackstonian method, Publius responded with a forceful attack.
In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under
consideration which DIRECTLY empowers the national courts to
construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or
which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be
claimed by the courts of every State.84
Hamilton's response to Brutus was lawyerly in the extreme. The
Constitution was silent on the question of how it ought to be interpreted.
There was nothing in its text that spoke to this issue directly. Hamilton
was also correct, at least in theory, that there was no aspect of this critique
of interpretation that could not be leveled "against the local judicatures in
general."8 Courts in every state commonly employed Blackstone's rules.
The first point, though certainly technically correct, evaded the core
critique of Brutus. While nothing in the text of the Constitution mandated
that it be interpreted according to the precepts of the lawyer's
constitution, which included orthodox Blackstonian rules, this was the
approach Hamilton believed judges should use to interpret the
Constitution. 86
Hamilton's response to Brutus raises a separate, but no less interesting
question: would the culture of the new federal courts be different than the
state judiciaries? Specifically, would the new federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, approach constitutional interpretation differently than
state courts? On this issue Publius and Brutus each had some evidence
upon which to base their very different assessments of this question.
Some state courts, most notably Virginia, were dominated by eminent
jurists, men such as St. George Tucker, who were deeply committed to the
traditional rules of Anglo-American jurisprudence. In Pennsylvania and
New York, by contrast, the state's highest court included self-made men
83. BRUTUS XV, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,supra note 63, at 419.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
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drawn from the ranks of the middling sort, men like George Bryan and
Robert Yates, whose approach to law reflected the ideas of the
constitutional middle ground.8 ' Brutus clearly believed that the state
courts would act differently than the federal courts. Dominated by men of
the middling sort whose interpretive methods would focus on public
meaning, not an orthodox Blackstonian search for intent, state courts
would better protect the people from the depredations they were likely to
suffer at the hands of an elitist judiciary. Thus, Brutus not only opposed
the elitism of Publius, but also the radicalism of plebeian
constitutionalism. His vision of the state judiciaries envisioned something
between the lawyer's constitution and the most populist vision of the
people's constitution. He wrote approvingly of the recent history of the
state judiciaries, which he believed had shown considerable restraint,
opposing the paper money laws, tender acts, and other pro-debtor actions.
Indeed, even Rhode Island: "The judges there gave a decision, in
opposition to the words of the Statute, on this principle, that a
construction according to the words of it, would contradict the
fundamental maxims of their laws."" Brutus did not favor state courts
because they would be pro-debtor, or less sympathetic to the rights of
property, he favored them because he thought them more likely to be
stocked with judges like himself: men who had demonstrated their
commitment to the rule of law, but were not overly legalistic in their cast
of mind. These types of judges would be more sympathetic to the
concerns and ideals of the middling sort, the broad yeomanry and
industrious artisans whom he believed were the most likely groups to be
disadvantaged by the triumph of the lawyer's Constitution."
Controversy over the danger posed by the lawyer's constitution became
an issue during the contest over the election of delegates to the New York
state ratification convention. The issue was particularly heated in New
York City where Federalists put forward a slate of candidates dominated
by lawyers and judges. In the campaign to elect delegates to the
convention, Federalists proudly asserted that knowledge of the law made
their slate superior.9 0 One writer lavished praise on the Federalists, noting
87. See CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW IN VIRGINIA, 1772-1804 (1987);
JOSEPH S. FOSTER, IN PURSUIT OF EQUAL LIBERTY: GEORGE BRYAN AND THE REVOLUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA (1994).
88. Brutus XIV, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 63, at 436.
89. On the ideology of middling Anti-Federalists, see CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note
27 at ch. 3.
90. On the controversy over the Federalist slate from New York City, see the documents gathered
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that Chancellor Robert Livingstone and Robert Morris were men who
were "the most proper and competent judges of judicial subjects."91
Another, describing himself as "A Citizen and Real Friend to Order and
good Government," echoed this sentiment, adding that John Jay's "legal
knowledge is incontrovertible." 92 This writer also praised James Duane's
skill and Alexander Hamilton's talents, noting that both candidates were
respected and skilled lawyers. 9 3 Local Federalists not only echoed these
sentiments in private, but they gave them a decidedly class-conscious
spin. Samuel Blachley Webb, boasted privately that "the Antis cannot
boast of a single great Character on their side."9 4 By contrast, Federalists
could count on a ticket composed of men of substance.9 5
Anti-Federalists did not dispute these Federalists claims but turned
these virtues into vices. One anonymous author, assuming the name
Honestus, recounted a lively chat in a local tavern that mocked the elitism
of Federalists. According to the report published by Honestus, it was
beyond dispute that inferior tradesmen and mechanics were less qualified
to judge the merits of the Constitution than skilled lawyers. In a passage
dripping with sarcasm he advised the people to defer to their wealthier
and better educated superiors, noting that the study of government was
"far beyond the reach of common capacities."9 6 Only those "who have
had a liberal education, and have time to study, can possibly be competent
to undertake such an important matter, as framing a government for such
an extensive country." 97 Despite attacks on their slate, Federalists won in
New York City. The underlying conflict between two opposing visions of
the constitutionalism was far from resolved. The same tension emerged in
the New York ratification convention. Each side found a formidable
champion: Alexander Hamilton defended the Federalist vision of the
in the Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. 21 DHRC, supra note 21, at 1483-
1510.
91. "Montgomery," N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 21 DHRC, supra note
21, at 1483.
92. "A Citizen, and Real Friend to Order and good Government," N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar.
21, 1788, reprinted in 21 DHRC, supra note 21, at 1489-91.
93. Id.
94. Letter from Samuel Blachley Webb to Joseph Barell (April 27 1788), reprinted in 21 DHRC,
supra note 21, at 1509-10.
95. Id.; Letter from Samuel Blachley Webb to Catherine Hogeboom (April 27, 1788), reprinted
in 21 DHRC, supra note 21, at 1509-10.
96. Honestus, N.Y. J., Apr. 26, 1.788, reprinted in 21 DHRC, supra note 21, at 1507. Although
this essay was reprinted in Massachusetts, there is no evidence to link it with Benjamin Austin's
Honestus essays. See HoNEsTus, supra note 42.
97. Honestus, supra note 96, at 1507.
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lawyer's constitution and Melancton Smith championed the people's
constitution. The debate within the convention echoed many of the
arguments that had been aired in the press in the lively debate between
Publius and Brutus.9 8
THE CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES IN THE PENNSYLVANIA
RATIFICATION CONVENTION
The same dynamic that would shape the struggle over constitutional
interpretation in Massachusetts and New York had also been evident in
Pennsylvania. The perspective of the lawyer's constitution was ably and
forcefully defended by two of the state's leading Federalists: Chief Justice
Thomas McKean, and James Wilson, arguably the nation's most
respected legal thinker and forward-looking legal theorist. On the other
side, a trio of Anti-Federalists leaders from western Pennsylvania
championed the people's constitution: Robert Whitehill, John Smilie, and
William Findley. All three men were classic examples of the type of
mediating figures who defined the constitutional middle ground, men who
may have read authors such as Blackstone, but were not wed to the
lawyer's constitution. More important than any rules of legal construction
was a recognition that "the natural course of power is to make the many
slaves to the few." 99
The debates within the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention were
wide-ranging, touching on virtually every point of disagreement between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The conflict between the lawyer's
constitution and the people's constitution inflected this discussion at many
points. Two particular flash points in the Convention's proceedings,
however, brought these two legal cultures to a head. The first conflict
involved Chief Justice McKean and John Smilie. In a manner reminiscent
of Zenas' attack on Honestus in Massachusetts, McKean dismissed
Smilie's convention speeches for simply rehashing the same type of
arguments being made in the popular press.'o Once again, the world of
the lawyer's constitution, a world of leather-bound legal treatises collided
with the world of the popular press with its "scribblers," including Anti-
Federalist essayists such as Brutus.'o' Smilie resented McKean's haughty
98. MAIER, supra note 20.
99. William Findley, Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Speech, in 2 DHRC, supra note 21,
at 439.
100. Zenas, supra note 50.
101. The substance of McKean's comments was recorded by Jasper Yates and James Wilson in
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behavior. The resulting exchange highlighted the clash of two distinct
legal cultures, one rooted in the treatises and traditions of Anglo-
American law, and the other a more populist variant of this tradition
filtered through the prism of the popular press. The second incident
involved James Wilson and William Findley and centered on a dispute
over the history of trial by jury that provided further evidence of the deep
gulf separating the lawyer's constitution from the people's constitution. In
the latter argument, Blackstone's Commentaries literally became a prop in
a complex legal drama acted out on the floor of the Convention.
The lengthy and sometimes rambling speeches of Anti-Federalists
within the Pennsylvania Convention left some Federalists exasperated.
Chief Justice McKean finally exploded, charging that his opponents had
wasted the Convention's valuable time in "trifling and unnecessary
debate."l 02 He dismissed the arguments of his Anti-Federalist opponents
as long-winded. Revealing his own bias against the popular press, he
condemned his opponents for simply rehashing ideas drawn from the
newspaper essayists of the day. Smilie shot back, attacking McKean for
his contempt for the people. In Smilie's view, Justice McKean had
arrogantly dismissed the concerns of Anti-Federalists as "contemptible."
One of McKean's supporters took particular offense at Smilie's attack,
which not only maligned McKean, but also implied a general critique of
the judiciary itself.103 William Findley jumped to Smilie's defense, and
after some additional heated exchanges between Federalist supporters of
McKean and Anti-Federalist defenders of Smilie and Findley, the
Convention adjourned for the day. 104
When the Convention resumed its business, Findley rose to address the
delegates on the history of trial by jury. In the course of his discussion of
this right, Findley suggested that Sweden had once enjoyed this venerable
right but had lost it. McKean and Wilson immediately rose to challenge
Findley's assertion that trial by jury existed anywhere outside of Britain.
Following closely on the heated exchange with McKean the day before,
Findley decided to produce two books, a volume of the Universal History
and a volume of Blackstone's Commentaries, citing them as authorities to
support his claims about the history of trial by jury. Findley's dramatic
gesture, literally rising with the two volumes in hand, was intended as a
their notes of the debates. See 2 DHRC, supra note 21, at 527-8.
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rebuke to McKean and Wilson, who had scoffed at Findley's suggestion
that the right of trial by jury had existed at some point in Swedish history.
Findley took full advantage of this opportunity to berate his opponents,
whose skepticism of his earlier claim he believed evidenced either a
"want of veracity or ignorance.""os Indeed, Findley went further, chiding
both men by noting that if his own "son had been at the study of law for
six months and was not acquainted with the passage in Blackstone, I
should be justified in whipping him."l 06 Brandishing the two books like
weapons, he aimed to prove to the Convention and the hostile Federalist
onlookers in the gallery that he was not some backcountry bumpkin.
Findley did not believe that texts such as Blackstone were the sole
province of judges or lawyers.
Rather than accept Findley's historical clarification graciously and
shrug off his rebuke, Wilson used the occasion to heap scorn on his less
well-educated opponent. Wilson confessed that, "I do not pretend to
remember everything I read." 07 His opponent, by contrast, Wilson
snidely observed, was clearly a person "whose stock of knowledge" was
"limited to a few items" which meant he could "easily remember and
refer to them." 0 8 Not content to belittle Findley's lack of education,
Wilson compared Findley's efforts to those of an upstart law student
trying to embarrass his teacher by pointing out a minor error. Wilson cited
the example of the great English lawyer Sir John Maynard who had
chastised a "petulant student" by reminding the student that "I have
forgotten more law than you ever learned."' 0 9
Although the gallery, packed with Federalist supporters, appreciated
Wilson's wit, the remarks did not play so well outside of the Convention's
halls. Indeed, Wilson's use of Maynard's memorable jibe was richly
ironic. The remark was not, as Wilson had remembered it, delivered as a
put-down to an upstart student, but rather was issued as a rebuke by one
of England's most eminent lawyers to the tyrannical hanging Judge
Jefferies, one of the most infamous figures in English legal history. The
irony was especially rich given that Chief Justice McKean was often
105. Findley, supra note 99, at 532.
106. Id.
107. The exchanges may be found at 2 DHRC, supra note 21, at 532, 551.
108. Id.
109. See 2 id at 532, 551 (transcribing an exchange in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention
between Findley, McKean, and Wilson). The two texts introduced by Findley were GEORGE SALE, ET
AL., THE MODERN PART OF AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY: FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNT OF TIME
(London, S. Richardson 1759); and WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
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called "Jefferies" by his enemies, including the Anti-Federalist publisher
Eleazer Oswald, who seized on the fracas in the state Ratification
Convention as an occasion to remind Pennsylvanians of the similarities
between the two jurists. Shortly after the heated exchange in the
Ratification Convention, Oswald's Independent Gazetteer carried a harsh
denunciation of Justice McKean's behavior, expressly comparing him to
the notorious Jefferies. The author of that essay, "A By-Stander,"
celebrated the fact that "three Pennsylvania farmers, all from the back
country," had humbled the Chief Justice, a professor, and so many
lawyers."o Dr. William Shippen, Jr., a Philadelphia Anti-Federalist,
endorsed this judgment, writing to his son that Findley had "triumphed
over McKean and Wilson to their infinite mortification.""' Shippen
contrasted Wilson's "dictatorial manner" with Findley's "modesty."ll 2
The embarrassment of McKean and Wilson was, he believed, a "stroke to
the pride of two men who think themselves the greatest in the United
States!" 1 3 Writing as "Hampden," Findley later condemned the work of
the Pennsylvania Convention, noting that "they were all, or nearly all,
eminent lawyers," a fact which did not lead Findley to place much trust in
their "political virtue." 1 4
Findley and other spokesmen for popular constitutionalism approached
texts such as Blackstone differently than did lawyers and judges schooled
in the way of the lawyer's constitution. As Robert Darnton notes,
historians of reading have identified an important distinction between
patterns of "intensive reading," in which a few texts are read over and
over, such as the Bible, and a more cosmopolitan mode of "extensive
reading" in which a broad range of texts are read. In the case of the
Founding Era's legal culture, one can discern an analogous, but different
sort of tension. Findley's mode of reading was extractive.11s For men such
110. A Bystander, INDEP. GAZETTEER (PHILA.), December 12, 1787. On Maynard's exchange
with Jefferies, see SAMUEL ARTHUR BRENT, SHORT SAYINGS OF GREAT MEN: WITH HISTORICAL AND
EXPLANATORY NOTES 379 (1882); and EDWARD FOSS, BIOGRAPHICA JURIDICA: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND, FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME, 1066-1870,
at 441 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1870).
111. Letter from William Shippen Jr. to Thomas Lee Shippen (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2
DHRC, supra note 21, at 549-50.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. William Findley, Hampden, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 2 DHRC,
supra note 21, at 669.
115. On the history of reading, and the distinction between intensive and extensive reading, see
Robert Damton, What is the History of Books? 65 DAEDALUS I 11(1982). See also AN EXTENSIVE
REPUBLIC: PRINT, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN THE NEW NATION, 1790-1840 (Robert A. Gross &
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as Findley and Smilie, the world of the popular press was at least as
important, if not more important, than the world of legal treatises. Legal
texts, including Blackstone's Commentaries, were less relevant as a
model of judicial reasoning than as a compendium of useful facts to be
consulted in much the same way one might use a farmer's almanac.
McKean and Wilson's approach to Blackstone was emulative. The
learned judge's writings were not simply a useful compendium of facts
about English law, Blackstone provided a model of legal reasoning that
had to be internalized and applied to the new context of American law. In
his law lectures, James Wilson explained this approach as one which
sought a scientific method in the law: "The most proper way to teach and
to study the common law is to teach and to study it as a historical
science."" The point was not simply extracting facts about the law, but
the goal was to internalize a particular legal method, what Wilson
described, in an Enlightenment idiom, as a science of the law. 117
McKean and Wilson's behavior in the Convention was not well
received in the backcountry and anger against them continued to simmer
even after ratification. Frustration led backcountry Anti-Federalists to
look askance at Federalist plans to stage a parade to mark their recent
victory in the state ratification convention. When Federalists turned out to
celebrate, Anti-Federalists responded with violence."' The two sides
clashed in the streets of Carlisle and the victorious Anti-Federalists meted
out symbolic punishment to McKean and Wilson. Drawing on the rich
traditions of plebeian culture, the crowd in Carlisle, Pennsylvania,
subjected the two Federalists to ritual humiliation before executing and
burning effigies of both men. It was an ignominious treatment for two of
the state's most respected legal figures and prominent supporters of the
Constitution. The protests of the Carlisle rioters dripped with hostility to
the elite conception of law implicit in the Federalist's defense of the new
Constitution. 19
The battle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists in the streets of the
town spilled over into the local newspaper, the Carlisle Gazette. An
Mary Kelly eds., 2010); David Hall, The Uses of Literacy in New England, 1600-1850, in CULTURES
OF PRINT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK 36-78 (1996).
116. James Wilson, Law Lectures, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 20, 25 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 2007).
117. Id.
118. On the Carlisle Riot and its significance in ratification, see CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS,
supra note 27.
119. For a discussion of this incident, see id. at 109-114.
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author claiming to be "One of the People" dismissed the notion that
Federalists were entitled to assemble and speak in favor of ratification.
Such a view clearly reflected the legalistic viewpoint of some local
Federalist "attorney" and did not reflect the sentiments of most local
residents. Local Anti-Federalists took the democratic ideal to its logical
extreme, arguing that Federalist actions were an insult to the local Anti-
Federalist majority. Indeed, Anti-Federalists believed that Federalists
should have put their decision to celebrate to a vote. The actions of the
Carlisle rioters showed little regard for freedom of expression or
association, a point not lost on local Federalists, who wondered why it
was necessary to call such a meeting to exercise one's "liberty" to
assemble.120 Federalist supporters expressed their disdain for the
ignorance of the Carlisle rabble; such condescension only fueled the ire of
local Anti-Federalists, who lashed out at their opponents. In Carlisle, the
struggle over the Constitution was tinged with class resentments and
antagonisms. In contrast to the more measured rhetoric and egalitarianism
evidenced in the writings of Brutus or the ratification speeches of William
Findley, this plebeian populist vision of law was closer in spirit to the
radicalism of Daniel Shays.
The violence in Carlisle's streets led to the prosecution of the mob's
leaders. The ensuing legal controversy further illustrates the deep
cleavage between the world of the lawyer's constitution and the people's
constitution. When the leaders of the riot were incarcerated, Anti-
Federalists turned to direct political action for relief. Rather than seek
formal legal redress and use constitutional means to free the prisoners,
local Anti-Federalists sought to mobilize the people themselves to act
extra-legally to resolve the crisis. The rioters rallied the countryside,
organizing themselves as militia units outside of state control and
prepared to free the prisoners by force. A compromise between members
of the local Federalist and Anti-Federalist elites avoided further violence
and bloodshed. The state's Attorney General entered a nolle prosequi and
the self-styled militia units were allowed to march to the jail and secure
the release of the rioters. 12'1
The conflict in the streets of Carlisle provides one of the clearest
examples of the profound disjuncture between the ideology of the
lawyers' constitution and the most radical version of the people's
120. Another ofthe People, CG; 2 DHRC, supra note 21, at 679-84.
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constitution. For the Carlisle rioters, constitutional interpretation did not
require any Blackstone. Indeed, it is not even clear that written
constitutions or courts mattered very much to these champions of an
extreme form of localist democracy. According to this radical theory,
popular local bodies such as the militia or the jury could spontaneously
collect the will of the people and, if necessary, bypass the courts and free
prisoners from jail. The Carlisle Rioters' views not only set them apart
from the Federalist elite, but also drove a wedge between them and
spokesmen for middling Anti-Federalists such as Brutus or William
Findley.
RESPUBLICA V. OSWALD: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ON TRIAL
Although the backcountry continued to simmer for some time,
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists continued to oppose the Federalist agenda.
An interesting coda to the struggle over ratification occurred when the
printer Eleazer Oswald published a blistering attack on Federalists in his
paper, The Independent Gazetteer. The object of Oswald's scorn, the
Federalist editor Andrew Brown, sued Oswald for libel and the case
eventually came before Thomas McKean, the man Oswald had labeled a
latter-day Judge Jefferies during the bitter struggles over ratification.
Oswald ridiculed Brown by calling him a "hand-maid of some of my
federalist enemies," which led Brown to follow through on his threat to
bring a charge of libel against the Anti-Federalist editor.122 Five years
earlier, in 1782, Oswald had stood before judge McKean on a libel
charge, but mounted a classic Zengarian defense, effectively using jury
nullification to thwart the prosecution. 123 This time, however, Oswald
over-played his hand when he attacked McKean in print. McKean struck
back, slapping Oswald with a contempt citation, a move that prevented
Oswald from coming before a jury. Typically, the doctrine of contempt
required that one's actions occur in court. McKean used the English legal
doctrine of constructive contempt, which allowed judges to construe
statements outside of the courtroom as instances of contempt if they
122. The most important documents pertaining to the case were published in pamphlet form. See,
e.g., A Gentlemen of the Law, in THE CASE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AGAINST ELEAZER OSWALD
(Philadelphia, William Spotswood 1788).
123. In essence, Oswald relied on jury nullification to block his prosecution for libel. On the
legal significance of the Zenger trial, see Paul Finkelman, Zenger's Case: Prototype of a Political
Trial, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 21-42 (Michal Belknap ed., 1994).
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interfered with court proceedings. 124
The relationship between the press and the jury was complex. At one
level Oswald clearly believed it was appropriate to try to sway public
opinion by challenging the neutrality of the court. A sympathetic writer in
the New York Journal noted that "it is not only the privilege, but the duty
of every citizen of this state to write and publish his sentiments upon the
proceedings of any branch of government." The author of this essay,
"An Observer," further noted that "the judicial power is one branch of
government, and therefore its proceedings are the objects of public
discussions, as much as the proceedings of the legislative and executive
powers."l 2 6 Thus, Oswald confidently asserted:
Enemies I have had in the legal profession and it may perhaps add
to the hopes of malignity that this action is instituted in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. However, if former prejudices
should be found to operate against me on the bench, it is with a
jury of my country, properly elected and empanelled, a jury of
freeman and independent citizens, I must rest the fruit. I have
escaped the jaws of persecution through this channel on certain
memorable occasions. 12 7
At the same time, Oswald was unwilling to take this idea to its ultimate
logical conclusion and claim that it was legally proper to influence a trial,
once proceedings had begun. Oswald was a vigorous supporter of the
people's constitution and clearly had little confidence in, or esteem for,
the lawyer's constitution. In his earlier prosecution he had taken full
advantage of the power of popular constitutionalism, using the jury to
nullify the prosecution against him. Juries, not judges, were the guardians
of liberty in this view. Critics accused him of trying to use the press to
interfere with the administration of justice, Oswald appeared to fall back
on an argument worthy of any lawyer. His statements about McKean, he
argued, had been made before the trial commenced and so was a
legitimate exercise of freedom of the press, not an example of tampering
124. See CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 27, at ch. 3. Anti-Federalists believed that
Pennsylvania law had not absorbed this English doctrine and that Pennsylvania law had decisively
broken with practices inconsistent with America's new republican legal system.
125. An Observer, N.Y. J., Aug. 14, 1788.
126. Id.
127. The Case of the Commonwealth Against Oswald, supra note 122, at 3. For an overview of
his earlier libel trial, see NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL (1990).
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with a jury.12 8
McKean's use of a constructive contempt citation only exacerbated
popular animosity toward him. He believed that constructive contempt
was a legitimate tool of courts necessary to preserve the power and
dignity of his judicial office. The fact that Oswald had not made his
statements directly before the court was irrelevant, as his comments had
been intended to undermine the authority of the court. "Judges," McKean
wrote, "discharge their functions under the solemn obligations of an oath;
and, if their virtue entitles them to their station, they can neither be
corrupted by favor to swerve from, nor influenced by fear to desert their
duty."1 29 Oswald's actions merited a contempt citation because they were
an attempt at "prejudicing the public" regarding "the merits of a case" and
hence interfered with the "administration of justice."' 3 0 When Oswald
demanded that the contempt charge be brought before a jury, McKean
replied that "whether the publication amounts to a contempt, or not, is a
point of law, which, after all, is the province of the judges, and not the
jury to determine.""'t
Oswald's attorney suggested that McKean's application of English
precedents on the law of libel and contempt were inappropriate because
Pennsylvania's Constitution rejected these doctrines. McKean, in contrast,
asserted that there was a strong continuity between the ideals of
Pennsylvania's Constitution and traditional English law, not a sharp
disjuncture. 3 2  Following an essentially Blackstonian mode of
construction, he asserted that there was nothing in the "language of the
Constitution (much less in its spirit and intention)" which authorized
Oswald's actions. 133
Oswald and his supporters argued that McKean's actions violated the
express provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which not only
protected freedom of the press, but expressly required a jury trial for
criminal matters. Once again, the two sides approached the law in
radically different ways. McKean used methods of construction and
interpretation that defined the essence of the lawyer's constitution: the
canonical rules of construction of English common law which focused on
128. To the Public, INDEP. GAZETTEER, July 26, 1788.
129. Respublica v. Oswald, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 319, 326 (Pa. 1788).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 319, 326
133. Id. at 325.
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the "spirit" of the law and the "intention" of its framers. By contrast,
Oswald's supporters offered up the plain meaning of the text, interpreted
without any recourse, to the traditions of Anglo-American law.
Oswald supporters saw McKean's actions as a manifestation of the
essentially anti-democratic spirit of elite legal culture. "X.Z." attacked the
use of "implied power" and was irate that "the party pretending to be
offended, is to decide on the offense."' 3 4 Such actions were typical of
those members of the legal elite who favored the lawyer's constitution
over the people's constitution. X.Z., wrote that "gentlemen of the robe
have too generally lofty ideas." His views mirrored those of William
Manning and Amos Singletary.'31 "Amongst the great," X.Z. wrote, "the
inferior class of mankind are viewed as a lower order of beings."13 6
"Gentlemen of the bar," he warned, "are very ingenious in producing
cases and opinions in court, to support particular points."' Legalisms
and latitudinarian constructions were a threat to popular liberty and had to
be combated. "No opinion," he declared, "must ever be permitted to
overrule the fundamental liberties of our country, or to destroy the express
words of our Constitution."' 38 The methods of legal interpretation used by
judges were insidious. X.Z. asserted that by "this sort of logic, the whole
constitution may be converted to a very ductile code." 39 In contrast to
McKean's reliance on the methods of the lawyer's constitution, X.Z. took
the plain meaning approach of the people's constitution a step further. In
his view constitutional texts were to be interpreted in an almost literal
fashion. Judges were not entitled to exercise any interpretive latitude and
were prohibited from discovering any implied power or authority beyond
the express grants made by the text of the Constitution. If Pennsylvanians
wished to endow their courts with the power of constructive contempt
they were free to do so by statute. If judges needed legal guidance, he
advised, they ought to look at the acts of the legislature, not the cases and
rules laid down by English judges and compiled by authors such as
Blackstone. Oswald clearly valued the scathing critique of X.Z., since he
decided to reprint it a month later, a fact that underscored the importance
of the essay's arguments.
134. X.Z., INDEP. GAZETTEER, July 28, 1788, reprinted in INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 22, 1788.
135. See supra pp. 309-10.
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Another pro-Oswald writer, "One of the People" reminded readers that
"it is the fashionable opinion of' those in power "that the common people
cannot understand and ought not to inquire into the proceedings of those
in power."l 40 He dismissed the argument that the common people were
"not sufficiently acquainted with the law" to understand their own
constitution and rights.' 41 "The advocates of oppression," he warned,
would have the people believe that "because you are not lawyers you do
not understand commonsense."1 42 Finally, reiterating a central tenet of
popular constitutionalism, he asserted that constitutional interpretation
was not some mysterious science of the law, but a matter of sorting out
the plain meaning of every day English.
One writer, calling himself "Public Justice," reminded readers not to be
over-awed by the "learned Chief Justice."l 43 Judges were well known to
use "constructive" means to pervert and twist the plain meaning of the
constitution's text. Simple common sense would ultimately prevail over
such "strained interpretations." McKean, he reminded his audience, had
been wrong before and had been humiliated by a "plain countryman,"
William Findley, in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention.'"
Rather than accept his contempt citation, Oswald decided to appeal
directly to the Pennsylvania Assembly. 14 The 1776 Constitution gave the
legislature exceptionally broad powers of impeachment. Section 9 also
provided "[t]he general assembly of the representatives of the freemen of
Pennsylvania, and shall have power to . . . redress grievances." 4 6 For
champions of popular constitutionalism, including Oswald, this power
was not restricted to enacting legislation, but also included a general
appellate authority to review the decisions of the Courts. Thus, Oswald
reminded readers that "the constitution of this state has left a mode of
redress," a direct appeal "to the fathers and protectors of the people," the
assembly.147 Oswald expressly described the legislature as a "court"
140. One of the Common People, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Aug. 7, 1788.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Public Justice, INDEP. GAZETTEER, July 30, 1788.
144. Id.
145. During the colonial period the legislature had often exercised judicial-like powers over
financial matters. The Pennsylvania Constitution went well beyond colonial precedents in endowing
the legislature with broad authority to address constitutional questions. See Christine Desan, The
Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, Ill IIARV.
L. REv. 1383 (1998).
146. PA. CONST. of 1776, §9.
147. [Eleazer Oswald] To the Public, THE PENNSYLVANIA MERCURY AND UNIVERSAL
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which could hold a judge of the Supreme Court "answerable."' 48 He
shared a belief, common among supporters of popular constitutionalism,
that the legislature was superior to the judiciary and had the power to
make the "bench tremble for their outrages."l 4 9 Oswald clearly hoped the
Assembly would not only vindicate him of all wrong-doing, but also that
they would impeach McKean.
The Assembly took the case and resolved itself into a committee of the
whole to consider the issue of impeachment and the substance of
Oswald's claims against McKean. The Chief Justice found an able
spokesman in the assembly in William Lewis, a respected Philadelphia
attorney." 0 Oswald's champion was William Findley.
Peppering his speech with references to Blackstone's Commentaries,
Lewis rejected the argument that the learned judge's venerable rules could
be glibly dismissed because of their author's Tory leanings. When he
turned his attention to Oswald's reading of the Pennsylvania
Constitution's provisions on jury trials and freedom of the press, Lewis
subjected them to a systematic critique, employing Blackstonian method
and a detailed knowledge of the relevant English precedents on both libel
and contempt.
Lewis began by reminding the Assembly of the difference between true
liberty and licentiousness. Freedom from "arbitrary and despotic rule"
was the true signification of liberty and was not to be confused with
"uncontrouled [sic] power of doing whatever the will might prompt,"'
which was antithetical to true liberty. Liberty properly understood was
only possible in a society in which individuals were well "regulated by
the laws and constitution of the state."' 5 2 In light of this overarching
principle, Lewis reasserted the orthodox Blackstonian view that freedom
of the press consisted of the absence of prior restraint, and did not shield
individuals from prosecution for publishing libels or items inconsistent
with ordered liberty.
Here, then, is to be discerned the genuine meaning of this section
in the bill of rights, which an opposite construction would
ADVERTISER, July 31, 1788.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Lewis eventually went on to a distinguished career as a federal attorney and judge. See
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF FEDERAL JUDGES, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=1395&cid=999&ctype-na&instate-na.
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prostitute to the most ignoble purposes. Every man may publish
what he pleases; but, it is at his peril, if he publishes any thing
which violates the rights of another, or interrupts the peace and
order of society.15 1
Disrupting the orderly processes of the court clearly fell outside the
scope of freedom of the press. Taking his case directly to the people did
not promote liberty, it undermined the rule of law.
It has been asserted, however, that Mr. Oswald's address was of a
harmless texture; that it was no abuse of the right of publication, to
which, as a citizen, he was entitled; and, in short, that in
considering it as a contempt of the court, the judges have acted
tyrannically, illegally, and unconstitutionally. But let us divest the
subject of these high-sounding epithets, and the reverse of this
assertion will be evident to every candid and unprejudiced mind:
For, such publications are certainly calculated to draw the
administration of justice from the proper tribunals; and in their
place to substitute newspaper altercations, in which the most
skilful writer will generally prevail against all the merits of the
case. 154
Oswald's actions obstructed justice and poisoned the well of public
opinion, effectively tampering with the jury. With a lawyerly flourish,
Lewis pointed out that such practices effectively replaced trial with
rhetoric battle. To depart from the established rules of construction would
ensnare the law in a "labyrinth of error, and eventually endanger that
liberty."15 5 In short, by preventing the law from becoming arbitrary, the
methods of the lawyer's constitution enhanced liberty, not undermined it.
William Findley rose to defend Oswald and in the process provided one
of the most eloquent critiques of the lawyer's constitution.15 ' First,
Findley argued that the American Revolution and the adoption of
Pennsylvania's radical democratic Constitution represented a clear break
with English law and many of Blackstone's ideas, which reflected "the
dark and distant periods of juridical history." 5 7 As far as methods of legal
interpretation were concerned, Findley defended the people's constitution
in forceful terms. Legal ideas required no recourse to formal legal
training. A strong proponent of popular constitutionalism, Findley averred
153. Id. at 319.
154. Id. at 326, 331.
155. Id. at 335-6.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 334.
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that every citizen "who possessed a competent share of common sense,
and understood the rules of grammar" could determine the meaning of the
Constitution. He attacked "the sophistry of the schools and the jargon of
the law" and warned that many legal techniques were designed to "pervert
or corrupt the explicit language of the text."1 8 Regarding freedom of the
press, he intoned, "there was nothing ambiguous or uncertain" about the
rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. "It would be fatal to
the cause of liberty" he asserted "if it was once established, that the
technical learning of a lawyer is necessary to comprehend the principles
laid down in this great compact between the people and their rulers."l5 9
Findley not only questioned the relevance of the lawyer's constitution,
but he also challenged its court-centered vision of constitutional
interpretation. In contrast to Lewis, Findley was not a strong supporter of
the idea of judicial review; he did not believe that courts were the final
arbiters of constitutional meaning. Indeed, he claimed that "the law of the
land was not, in fact, contra-distinguished from the judgment of his peers,
but merely a diversity in the mode of expressing the same thing."160
Findley was defending an expansive role for the jury to decide both the
facts of the case and the law. In essence, Findley was arguing that the
meaning of both the Constitution and the law was what the jury decided
using common sense. 16 1 Popular constitutionalism held that the plain
meaning of the text was something that the people themselves, acting
through popular bodies such as the jury, would decide. Findley's variant
of popular constitutionalism closely resembled modern theories of a living
constitution, with one important difference. The agents of constitutional
change would not be the judiciary, but the people themselves, acting
through their legislatures.
Oswald's supporters were unable to persuade the Assembly that an
impeachable offense had been committed. Findley then proposed the
following two resolutions:
'Resolved, That the proceedings of the supreme court against Mr.
Eleazer Oswald, in punishing him by fine and imprisonment, at
their discretion, for a constructive or implied contempt, not
committed in the presence of the court, nor against any officer, or
order thereof, but for writing and publishing improperly, or
158. Id. at 335.
159. Id. at 335.
160. Id. at 335.
161. CORNELL, OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 27, at 128-34.
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indecently, respecting a cause depending before the supreme
court, and respecting some of the judges of said court, was an
unconstitutional exercise of judicial power, and sets an alarming
precedent, of the most dangerous consequence, to the citizens of
this commonwealth.'
'Resolved, That it be specially recommended to the ensuing
General Assembly, to define the nature and extent of contempts,
and direct their punishment.'16 2
The resolutions prompted another round of lively debate but were
eventually defeated. Once again, Lewis rose to challenge Findley and the
people's constitution. Findley's resolutions, he believed, were not only
wrong on the facts before the Assembly, but represented a dangerous
precedent that threatened the independence of the judiciary, the doctrine
of judicial review, and undermined the very idea of a written constitution.
Lewis provided an excellent summary of several features of the lawyer's
constitution
1st. That the legislative power is confined to making the law, and
cannot interfere in the interpretation: which is the natural and
exclusive province of the judicial branch of the government: and
2ndly, That the recommendation to the succeeding assembly
would be nugatory: for the courts of justice derive their powers
from the constitution, a source paramount to the legislature; and,
consequently, what is given to them by the former, cannot be
taken from them by the latter.16 3
The battle between the lawyer's constitution and the people's
constitution did not end with Respublica v. Oswald. This tension would
reemerge periodically during the ensuing decade as Americans struggled
to define the contours of their new Constitution and grappled with how
the Constitution would be interpreted and who would speak for the people
and be the final arbiter of meaning -legislatures, courts, or local
institutions such as the jury, the militia, or even the crowd.164
HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND ORIGINALISM
The rise of New Originalism marks a serious step backward in the
evolution of American constitutional theory. Supporters of New
162. Findley, supra note 99, at 337.
163. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 337.
164. Kramer, supra note 26.
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Originalism have not solved the problems of traditional Originalism, but
have offered a theory even more prone to abuse and manipulation. In
contrast to intentionalist models of Originalism which focus on the
meanings of identifiable groups within the Founding Era, either Framers
or Ratifers, New Originalism's focus on public meaning provides an
invitation to cherry-pick quotes and manipulate evidence: it is an open
invitation to writing law-office history on a grand scale. 1 5 The essential
problem that plagued traditional Originalism continues to plague New
Originalism: neither method has developed a rigorous historical
methodology. Champions of Originalism, old and new, have embraced a
theory rooted in history, while remaining resolutely anti-historical in their
thinking.166 Until Originalists recognize that they must master the basic
techniques of intellectual history and understand the major modern
historical debates about eighteenth-century political and constitutional
history, and gain something more than a passing knowledge of Founding-
era sources, their claims will continue to generate ideological manifestos
masquerading as serious scholarship.
Ironically, one of the main insights of the so-called New Originalism,
its emphasis on interpreting the Constitution according to public meaning,
turns out not to be new at all, but is virtually identical to an approach to
constitutional interpretation that was first championed more than two
hundred years ago by Anti-Federalists such as Brutus. The periodic
revival of an Anti-Federalist constitutionalism is in some sense hard wired
into the structure of American constitutionalism. While such a process has
often been self-conscious, at other times Americans have unknowingly
reinvented an essentially Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. '67
Given the structures created by the Federalist Constitution, a revival of
Anti-Federalist criticism, seems inevitable. In this sense, New Originalism
is unremarkable; New Originalists are merely the latest in a long line of
dissenters to revive an Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. What
is a bit embarrassing about New Originalism is that its authors do not
seem to be aware of the Anti-Federalist origins of their theory, or
appreciate the irony that their version of Originalism would not restore the
165. For a thoughtful critique of New Originalism's potential for abuse, see Richard S. Kay,
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 703
(2009).
166. See discussion, supra pp. 2 9 5 -3 0 7 .
167. See, e.g., Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84
NW. U. L. REv. 39, 59-60 (1990); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of
the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REv. 217, 223 (2004).
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Constitution's original meaning, but would turn history upside down,
effectively replacing our Federalist Constitution, with an Anti-Federalist
one.
There are further ironies arising from the emergence of the New
Originalism. A careful historical exploration of Founding-era practice
conclusively demonstrates that the textualist theories of Justice Scalia,
grounded in a public meaning approach, are themselves entirely at odds
with the dominant modes of interpretive practice in place in the Founding
Era. The Blackstonian search for Framers' intent, the Madisonian focus
on Ratifiers' intent, and the living Originalist search for the public
meaning advanced by some Anti-Federalists all have solid precedents in
Founding-era practice. The one theory without a firm foundation in the
Founders' world is New Originalism, including Justice Scalia's
textualism.
Better history will not eliminate future controversies, but it will provide
an intellectual and methodological rigor currently lacking in Originalist
jurisprudence and scholarship. An honest theory of Originalism must
begin with the recognition that there is no neutral or principled way to
choose among the competing interpretive practices at play in the
Founding Era. 161 Originalism is not and can never be the neutral method it
professes to be; at best, Originalism requires that we take sides in the
Founding Era's own interpretive battles. Forcing Originalists to be more
transparent about their method will not put an end to law-office history or
judicial activism, but it will make certain types of interpretive sleights of
hand more difficult and more intellectually embarrassing. Consider the
two recent gun cases decided by the Court, Heller and McDonald. In
Heller, Scalia rejected the intentionalist model of Originalism found in
Justice Stevens's dissent. Yet, in McDonald, Scalia happily signed on to
Justice Alito's opinion, which included a lengthy discussion of the
original intent of the Congress responsible for framing the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court majority simply switched Originalist method to
arrive at a politically congenial result. Forcing greater historical rigor on
Originalists would not prevent such intellectual inconsistency, but it
would make it easier to spot efforts to rig the methodology to produce the
desired result. '
168. Kramer, supra note 26. Indeed, to be genuinely historical one would need to account not
only for the interpretive pluralism in place during the Founding Era, but also deal with the way
interpretive practices shifted as the Founders struggled to make sense of the new Constitution.
169. Compare the originalist method of Justice Scalia in Heller, which dismisses the relevance of
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Rather than retreat from history, the only intellectually plausible
strategy for Originalism is to embrace it. Originalist scholars and judges
have not only shown a shocking lack of knowledge of Founding-Era
interpretive practices, but they have also been ignorant of important recent
developments in the humanities, including history, literature, and
philosophy. If Originalism is to become a serious intellectual enterprise,
and not simply remain an ideological tool, it must cease to be a
conversation among a narrow group of true believers and must become
truly inter-disciplinary. 7 0
the thought of the First Congress that drafted the Second Amendment, with the authority accorded to
the Reconstruction Era Congress that drafted the 14"' Amendment in Justice Alito's McDonald
majority. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
170. Originalists continue to publish primarily in law reviews and host conference dominated by
law professors (primarily adherents of Originalism), which has lent the theory a very parochial
character. The historical and philosophical flaws in the theory are simply recycled by this system. See
Originalism 2.0: The Twenty-Ninth Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law
and Public Policy, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2011); Symposium: Original Ideas on
Originalism: 103 NW. U. L. Rev. 751 (2009).
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